Selected Articles
on undoing
Words are used to do a plethora of things: to promise, invite, press charges. So far, so good – nothing more than J.L. Austin’s legacy to the philosophy of language. But words are also used to undo things: to take back promises, rescind invitations, drop charges. This has surprisingly been long neglected in speech act theory. I've written about retraction as the chief undoing strategy. I've analyzed retraction as a 'higher-order speech act' and vis-à-vis cognate strategies such as annulment and amendment.
'Counterevidentials' (with Neri Marsili), Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2024).
'"Actually: Scratch That!" A Tour Into the Illocutionary Fabric of Retraction', in D. Zeman & M. Hîncu (eds.), Retraction Matters: New Developments in the Philosophy of Language, Springer (2024).
'Undoing Things with Words', Synthese, 197 (2020).
on silencing
A speaker can be silenced by being forced into keeping their mouth shut. But this isn't the only way of silencing. Sometimes, a speaker is free to talk but is unjustly prevented from doing things with their words (e.g. refusing, testifying, protesting). This is what philosophers name 'illocutionary silencing'. I have a longstanding interest in this sense of silencing. I've written about how to define it, how to map its varieties, and how rape myths may silence women in the sexual arena. Mary Kate McGowan and I are currently co-writing a crossover book on the topic.
'A Comprehensive Definition of Illocutionary Silencing', Topoi (2021).
'On Silencing, Authority, and the Act of Refusal', Rivista di estetica (2017).
on refusal and 'open calls'
Many philosophers take sexual refusal to be the paradigmatic target of illocutionary silencing. That's where my interest in refusal comes from. I've written about refusal as a speech act family comprising negative replies to 'open calls'. I find one type of open call – i.e. request for permission – particularly interesting as it can supply a mechanism to unwittingly give away part of one's authority. My analysis of refusal applies, mutatis mutandis, to consent. I'm currently working on a paper on the sui generis normative role of refusal and its implications for how we conceive of speech act normativity.
'The Pragmatic Structure of Refusal', Synthese (2023).
'Accommodated Authority: Broadening the Picture', Analysis (2022).
on counterspeech
Philosophers have pointed out that hate speech, and bigoted speech more broadly, has the potential to shape our normative landscapes by changing the bounds of what is permissible. Empirical evidence suggests that hate speech elicits social exclusion, reduces wellbeing among targets, and promotes dehumanizing attitudes in non-targets. Against this backdrop, the question of how to resist becomes pressing. I've written about a range of counterspeech strategies, focusing particularly on 'bending' – a distorting move that, if successful, may turn a bigoted utterance into a non-bigoted (and sometimes anti-bigotry) contribution.
'The Philosophy of Counter-Language' (with Bianca Cepollaro), in S. Ullmann & M. Tomalin (eds.), Counterspeech: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Countering Dangerous Speech, Routledge (2023).
'Bending as Counterspeech' (with Bianca Cepollaro), Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2023).
other topics
I've also written about epistemic injustice (in Italian, with Tommaso Piazza), the language of mathematical proofs (with Luca San Mauro and Giorgio Venturi), and more.
See my CV for a full list of my publications. Pre-prints of my articles are freely available on my Academia page.